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Abstract:  
We study the effect of investment on the dynamics of aggregate capital when different 
sectors of the economy compete strategically for the utilization of non-excludable capital 
to produce both consumption and investment goods. We consider two types of 
investment goods: complements and substitutes. For each case, we derive the 
equilibrium and provide the corresponding stationary distribution. We then compare the 
equilibrium with the social planner’s optimal solution. 
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1 Introduction
Capital theory is an essential aspect of economics since it conveys the im-
portance of dynamics on the structure of the economy. It is the notion of
aggregate capital in which capital is fungible that is the basis of growth the-
ory as studied in Solow (1956) for the positive non-stochastic case, Mirman
(1972, 1973) for the positive stochastic case, Cass (1965) and Koopmans
(1965) for the optimal non-stochastic case, and Brock and Mirman (1972)
and Mirman and Zilcha (1975) for the optimal stochastic case. Although
it is important to understand the optimal path of aggregate capital, the ef-
fect of several sectors in the economy competing for the utilization of capital
should also be understood. Indeed, non-excludable capital structures such
as airports, harbors, roads, pipe lines, transmission grids, railroads, telecom-
munications lines, energy are ubiquitous. In utilizing non-excludable capital,
each sector of the economy needs to consider the interests of their competi-
tors. This is an important issue in macroeconomics because it has an eﬀect
on the accumulation of capital and economic growth.
These strategic interactions for the use of non-excludable capital give rise
to diﬀerent sorts of externalities. The ﬁrst one to be studied in a dynamic
context was the dynamic externality (Mirman, 1979; Levhari and Mirman,
1980), i.e., the utilization of non-excludable capital by one sector has an
eﬀect on the other sectors’ payoﬀs. Indeed, a sector which increases its usage
of telecommunication lines reduces the eﬀective use of this capital structure
by the other sectors due to fact that too few lines are created. The dynamic
externality yields a greater utilization of the capital, and, therefore, a smaller
steady state of capital. In a more recent paper, Koulovatianos and Mirman
(2007) studies the link between market structure and industry dynamics.
For instance, the public and private sectors utilize capital to produce similar
ﬁnal goods such as health goods. The interaction of entities in the market
for ﬁnal goods gives rise to a market externality. Koulovatianos and Mirman
(2007) shows that the combination of market and dynamic externalities has
an ambiguous eﬀect on the overall utilization of the capital as well as the
steady state.
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All these studies consider implicitly the utilization of non-excludable cap-
ital for the production of consumption goods. Yet, various sectors of the
economy also produce investment goods, engage in R&D and technological
progress, which has a profound eﬀect on the dynamics of the stock of non-
excludable capital. The interaction of sectors for investing in capital gives rise
to an investment externality, i.e., the utilization of capital from one sector
in order to invest in future capital has an eﬀect on the other sector’s payoﬀ
through the appreciation of the future stock. For instance, if the productive
activities of one sector improves the eﬀectiveness of telecommunication lines,
then all sectors beneﬁt from it via a better stock of capital.
It is the purpose of this paper to study the dynamics of capital in a
situation in which diﬀerent sectors of the economy compete strategically in
the utilization of capital to produce both consumption and investment goods.
To that end, we adapt the Levhari and Mirman (1980) framework to gain
insight into the eﬀect of strategic investment on behavior and the dynamics
of capital. In our model, sectors not only utilize a stock for the production
of consumption goods, but also for the production of investment goods. The
evolution of capital depends on utilization, several random shocks, as well as
the investment goods, which gives rise to an investment externality.
We consider two types of investment goods: complements and substitutes.
For each case, we derive the dynamic Cournot-Nash equilibrium under ﬁnite
and inﬁnite horizons. We also provide the stationary distribution corre-
sponding to the inﬁnite-horizon equilibrium. We then compare the outcome
of the game with the social planner’s optimal solution. We show that there
is a tragedy of the commons in the sense that the game (compared to social
planning) yields more utilization. In addition, the game leads to an increase
in the production of consumption goods and a decrease in the production
of investment goods. As a result, the investment externality has a negative
eﬀect on the stationary distribution of capital.
The framework we adopt is not only useful for the study of economic
growth in a macroeconomy with aggregate non-excludable capital being uti-
lized by several sectors. But it is also useful to study at the industry level in
which ﬁrms use industry-speciﬁc capital to produce both consumption and
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investment goods. Similarly, in the study of natural resources, exploiters
extract non-excludable capital goods such as stocks of ﬁsh, water, oil, which
is then used for production of consumption and investment goods.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
deﬁnes the equilibrium. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium under for
both complements and substitutes and provides the stationary distributions
under a game. Section 4 studies the eﬀect of the investment externality by
comparing the equilibrium outcomes with the optimal solution of the social
planner. Section 5 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 Model and Equilibrium
In this section, we present a dynamic game in which two sectors compete in
the utilization of a non-excludable capital in order to produce consumption
and investment goods. Consumption goods yield immediate payoﬀ whereas
investment goods have an eﬀect on future payoﬀs through the dynamics of
the capital. We ﬁrst present the general model. We then deﬁne the recur-
sive Cournot-Nash equilibrium. In the subsequent sections, we characterize
the equilibrium under both complementary and substitutionary investment
goods. We then compare the equilibrium outcomes with the social planner’s
solution.
Let yt be the stock of eﬃciency units of non-excludable capital available
at the beginning of period t. Absent utilization and investment, the stock of
units of capital evolves stochastically according to the rule1
y˜t+1 = f(yt, α˜t) (1)
where f(·) is the transition function and α˜t is an iid random technological
shock in period t, i.e., the shock is realized in period t + 1.
In period t, for j = 1, 2, sector j utilizes ej,t units of capital in order to
produce cj,t units of consumption goods and ij,t units of investment goods.
Production is linear so that ej,t = cj,t + ij,t. The production of consumption
1A tilde sign distinguishes a random variable from its realization.
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goods yields immediate payoﬀs π(cj,t). The sectors’ utilization of the capital
and their production of investment goods have an eﬀect on the future stock.
Using (1),
y˜t+1 = g(i1,t, i2,t, η˜t) · f(yt − e1,t − e2,t, α˜t) (2)
where g(·) is the investment function and η˜t is a N -vector of iid shocks in
period t. To simplify notation, the t-subscript for indexing time is hereafter
removed and the hat sign is used to indicate the value of a variable in the
subsequent period, i.e., y is stock today and, given any realizations of η and
α,
yˆ = g(i1, i2,η) · f(y − e1 − e2, α) (3)
is stock tomorrow. From (3), investment is needed to maintain capital and
ensure its future use.
To distinguish among diﬀerent horizons of the dynamic game, we use
the index τ = 0, 1, . . . , T . Given a horizon and the present stock of the
non-excludable capital, sector j maximizes the expected sum of discounted
payoﬀs over utilization and production of both consumption and investment
goods. Formally, for j, k = 1, 2, j = k, the τ -period-horizon value function of
sector j is
vτj (y) = max
ej ,ij
{π(ej − ij) + δEvτ−1j (g(ij, ik, η˜) · f(y − ej − ek, α˜))} (4)
where cj = ej − ij and E is the expectation operator for η˜ and α˜. From (4),
sector k’s choices have an eﬀect on sector j’s expected sum of discounted
payoﬀs through the dynamics of capital.
In general, in a dynamic game, the value function deﬁned in (4) might not
be concave (Mirman, 1979). In addition, our model includes two inherently
dynamic decisions for each sector as well as several random shocks. In order
to characterize the equilibrium and study its properties under diﬀerent cases
of investment goods, we resort to a modiﬁed version of the Levhari and
Mirman (1980) framework. The following assumptions hold for the remainder
of the paper. We leave the investment function unspeciﬁed for the moment
and consider several types of investment goods in the next sections.
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Assumption 2.1. The joint p.d.f. of η˜ and α˜ is φ(η, α),η ∈ (0, 1)N , α ∈
(0, 1). Let η ≡ Eη˜ and α ≡ Eα˜ be the means of the random shocks.
Assumption 2.2. For j = 1, 2, π(cj) = ln cj.
Assumption 2.3. For α ∈ (0, 1), f(y − ej − ek, α) = (y − ej − ek)α.
We now deﬁne the recursive Cournot-Nash equilibrium for a T -period-
horizon game (Levhari and Mirman, 1980). The equilibrium consists of the
strategies of the two sectors for every horizon from the ﬁrst period (when
there are T periods left) to the last period (when there is no horizon). With-
out loss of generality, we assume that in the last period the two sectors split
the stock equally and do not invest. The assumption of a log utility function
implies that the allocation of the stock in the last period has no eﬀect on the
dynamic game. Condition 1 states the behavior in the last period, i.e., when
the horizon is τ = 0. Condition 2 states the recursive equilibrium for every
horizon of the game. Expression (6) for τ = 1 is consistent with statement 1,
i.e., for all j, V 0j (y) = ln(E
0
j (y)− I0j (y)). Expression (6) for τ = 2, . . . , T − 1
reﬂects the recursive nature of the equilibrium in which the equilibrium con-
tinuation value function for a τ -period horizon depends on the equilibrium
strategies for τ ′-period horizons, τ > τ ′ ≥ 0.
Definition 2.4. The tuple {Eτ1(y), Iτ1(y), Eτ2(y), Iτ2(y)}Tτ=0 is a recursive Cournot-
Nash equilibrium for a T -period-horizon game if, for all y > 0,
1. For τ = 0, E01(y) = E
0
2(y) = y/2, I
0
1(y) = I
0
2(y) = 0.
2. For τ = 1, 2, . . . , T , for j, k = 1, 2, j = k, given {Eτk(y), Iτk(y)}
and {Et1(y), I t1(y), Et2(y), I t2(y)}τ−1t=0 ,
{Eτj (y), Iτj (y)} =arg max
ej ,ij
{
ln(ej − ij)
+ δ
∫
V τ−1j (g(ij, I
τ
k(y),η) · (y − ej − Eτk(y))α) · φ(η, α)dηdα
}
(5)
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where, for any x > 0,
V τ−1j (x) =
{
ln(x/2), τ = 1
ln(Eτ−1j (x)− Iτ−1j (x)) + δ
∫
V τ−2j (Λ) · φ(η, α)dηdα, τ = 2, 3, ..., T
(6)
with
Λ ≡ g(Iτ−11 (x), Iτ−12 (x),η) ·
(
x−
∑2
s=1
Eτ−1s (x)
)α
. (7)
3 Equilibrium Characterization
In this section, we fully characterize the equilibrium for any ﬁnite horizon.
We then show that the limit of the ﬁnite-horizon equilibrium exists. In other
words, there exists an equilibrium for the inﬁnite horizon that is consistent
with the sequence of ﬁnite-horizon equilibrium. Hence, the existence and the
properties of the equilibrium are robust to any ﬁnite and inﬁnite horizon.
We then provide the stationary distribution for capital corresponding to the
limiting case.
We begin with the case of complementary investment goods. We then re-
peat the analysis for the case of substitutionary investment goods. The main
diﬀerence between complements and substitutes concern uniqueness. When
investment goods are complementary, the equilibrium is unique whereas there
is a continuum of equilibrium points with substitutionary investment goods.
However, regardless of the type of investment goods, the stationary distri-
bution of capital is unique. In the next section, we compare the equilibrium
with the solution of the social planner.
3.1 Complementary Investment Goods
When investment goods are complementary, the investment function is spec-
iﬁed as
g(i1, i2,η) = i
η1
1 i
η2
2 , (8)
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η ≡ [η1, η2]. Using (8), (3) is rewritten as
yˆ = iη11 i
η2
2 (y − e1 − e2)α. (9)
The investment term iη11 i
η2
2 reﬂects the complementarity of the sectors’ in-
vestments. The shocks η1 and η2 measure the individual contribution of the
investment goods toward the future stock.
Proposition 3.1 provides the utilization level as well as the production
levels for consumption and investment goods corresponding to the unique
equilibrium for any ﬁnite horizon. The equilibrium displays certainty equiv-
alence, i.e., the means of the shocks are the only moments of the distribution
to have an eﬀect on decisions. Moreover, the equilibrium is in general asym-
metric unless the means of the investment shocks are identical.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose that the investment goods are complementary.
Then, there exists a unique recursive Cournot-Nash equilibrium for a T -
period game, T = 1, 2, . . . In equilibrium, for τ = 0, 1, . . . , T , for j = 1, 2,
sector j utilizes
Eτj (y) =
1 + δηj
(
τ−1∑
t=0
δt(η1 + η2 + α)
t
)
2 + δ(η1 + η2 + α)
(
τ−1∑
t=0
δt(η1 + η2 + α)
t
)y (10)
units of capital for the production of
Cτj (y) =
1
2 + δ(η1 + η2 + α)
(
τ−1∑
t=0
δt(η1 + η2 + α)
t
)y (11)
units of consumption goods and
Iτj (y) =
δηj
(
τ−1∑
t=0
δt(η1 + η2 + α)
t
)
2 + δ(η1 + η2 + α)
(
τ−1∑
t=0
δt (η1 + η2 + α)
t
)y (12)
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units of investment goods.
Proof. We ﬁrst derive utilization, investment, and value functions in the one-
period horizon. We then consider a τ -period horizon and solve for utilization,
investment and value functions recursively. We ﬁnally impose the initial
condition given by the one-period-horizon solution.
1. Consider ﬁrst the one-period horizon. Using (5), (6), and (9), for j, k =
1, 2, j = k, given {E1k(y), I1k(y)}, sector j’s one-period-horizon optimal
policies satisfy
{E1j (y), I1j (y)} =arg max
ej ,ij
{
ln(ej − ij) + δηj ln ij + δηk ln I1k(y)
+δα ln(y − ej −E1k(y))− δ ln 2
}
. (13)
The ﬁrst-order conditions corresponding to (13) are
ej :
1
ej − ij =
δα
y − ej −E1k(y)
, (14)
ij :
1
ej − ij =
δηj
ij
, (15)
evaluated at ej = E
1
j (y) and ij = I
1
j (y). Since the Hessian matrix is
negative deﬁnite, the second-order condition holds. For j, k = 1, 2, j =
k, solving (14) and (15) for the equilibrium yields the unique solution
for one-period-horizon utilization and investment,
E1j (y) =
1 + δηj
2 + δ (η1 + η2 + α)
y, (16)
I1j (y) =
δηj
2 + δ (η1 + η2 + α)
y. (17)
Plugging (16) and (17) for the two sectors into the objective function
in (13) yields
V 1j (y) = (1 + δ(η1 + η2 + α)) ln y +Ψ1, (18)
where Ψ1 is a constant for the one-period horizon that has no eﬀect on
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the solution.
2. Having solved for the one-period horizon, we consider next a τ -period
horizon for which the continuation value function is of the form V τ−1j (y) =
κτ−1 ln y+Ψτ−1 where κτ−1 and Ψτ−1 are constants. For j, k = 1, 2, j =
k, given V τ−1j (y) = κτ−1 ln y + Ψτ−1 and {Eτk (y), Iτk(y)}, sector j’s τ -
period-horizon optimal policies satisfy
{Eτj (y), Iτj (y)} =arg max
ej ,ij
{
ln(ej − ij) + δηjκτ−1 ln ij + δηkκτ−1 ln Iτk(y)
+δακτ−1 ln(y − ej − Eτk(y)) + δΨτ−1} . (19)
The ﬁrst-order conditions corresponding to (19) are
ej :
1
ej − ij =
δακτ−1
y − ej − Eτk(y)
(20)
ij :
1
ej − ij =
δηjκτ−1
ij
(21)
evaluated at ej = E
τ
j (y) and ij = I
τ
j (y). Since the Hessian matrix is
negative deﬁnite, the second-order condition holds. For j, k = 1, 2, j =
k, solving (20) and (21) for the equilibrium yields the unique solution
for τ -period utilization and investment,
Eτj (y) =
1 + δηjκτ−1
2 + δκτ−1(η1 + η2 + α)
y (22)
Iτj (y) =
δηjκτ−1
2 + δκτ−1(η1 + η2 + α)
y. (23)
Plugging (22) and (23) for the two sectors into the objective function
in (19) yields
V τj (y) = (1 + δκτ−1(η1 + η2 + α)) ln y +Δτ , (24)
≡ κτ ln y +Ψτ , (25)
where Δτ and Ψτ are constants that we ignore since they have no eﬀect
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on the solution. Hence,
κτ = 1 + δκτ−1(η1 + η2 + α) (26)
with, from (18), initial condition
κ1 = 1 + δ(η1 + η2 + α). (27)
From (26) and (27), it follows that
κτ =
τ∑
t=0
δt(η1 + η2 + α)
t. (28)
Plugging (28) into (22) and (23) yields (10) and (12), respectively.
Plugging (10) and (12) into Cτj (y) = E
τ
j (y)− Iτj (y) yields (11).
We now show that there is no disparity between the ﬁnite and inﬁnite
horizons. Speciﬁcally, using Proposition 3.1, we show that the limits of the
equilibrium outcomes exist. In other words, there exists a unique equilibrium
for the inﬁnite horizon that is consistent with the sequence of ﬁnite-horizon
equilibrium. We then use these limiting outcomes to derive the unique sta-
tionary distribution for capital. Proposition 3.2 provides the limits of the
equilibrium outcomes.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that the investment goods are complementary. If
η1 + η2 + α ∈ (0, 1), then for j, k = 1, 2, j = k, limT→∞ETj (y) ≡ E∞j (y),
limT→∞CTj (y) ≡ C∞j (y), and limT→∞ ITj (y) ≡ I∞j (y) exist such that
E∞j (y) =
1− δ(ηk + α)
2− δ(η1 + η2 + α)
y, (29)
C∞j (y) =
1− δ(η1 + η2 + α)
2− δ(η1 + η2 + α)
y, (30)
I∞j (y) =
δηj
2− δ(η1 + η2 + α)
y. (31)
12
Proof. Given that η1 + η2 + α ∈ (0, 1), taking limits of (10), (11) and (12)
yields (29), (30) and (31), respectively.
Using the limiting outcomes, Proposition 3.3 provides the stationary dis-
tribution of capital. Due to the fact that the equilibrium displays certainty
equivalence, the stationary distribution depends directly on the means of the
shocks. However, through (9), the stationary distribution of capital depends
on the distribution of the shocks, i.e., ﬁrst and higher moments.
Proposition 3.3. Suppose that the investment goods are complementary.
Then, the stationary distribution of capital is deﬁned by
Y˜ =
(
ηη˜11 η
η˜2
2 α
α˜δη˜1+η˜2+α˜
(2− δ (η1 + η2 + α))η˜1+η˜2+α˜
) 1
1−(η˜1+η˜2+α˜)
. (32)
Proof. Plugging (29) and (31) into (9) and solving for Y˜ = yˆ = y yields (32).
3.2 Substitutionary Investment Goods
When investment goods are substitutionary, the investment function is spec-
iﬁed as
φ(i1, i2,η) = (i1 + i2)
η, (33)
η ≡ η. Using (33), (3) is rewritten as
yˆ = (i1 + i2)
η(y − e1 − e2)α, (34)
The investment term (i1 + i2)
η reﬂects the perfect substitutability of the
sectors’ investments.
Unlike the case of complementary investment goods, the equilibrium is
not unique. In fact, when investment goods are substitutionary, there is a
continuum of equilibrium that admits any allocation of the total investment
between the two sectors but leaves total investment unchanged. The mul-
tiplicity of the equilibrium has no bearing on the dynamics of the capital
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and thus on sectors’ future payoﬀs since, from (34), only total investment
matters.
Proposition 3.4 states the properties of the equilibrium. The multiplic-
ity of the equilibrium is reﬂected by the allocation of the investment goods
between sectors 1 and 2. That is, for j = 1, 2, γ1,τ ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction
of total investment undertaken by sector j when the horizon is τ periods.
Hence, γ1,τ + γ2,τ = 1.
Proposition 3.4. Suppose that the investment goods are substitutionary.
Then, there exists a continuum of recursive Cournot-Nash equilibrium for a
T -period game, T = 1, 2, . . . For any equilibrium, for τ = 1, ..., T ,
1. Cτ1(y) = C
τ
2(y).
2. For j = 1, 2 and for any allocation {γ1,τ , γ2,τ} such that γ1,τ , γ2,τ ∈
[0, 1], γ1,τ + γ2,τ = 1, I
τ
j (y) = γj,τ · (Iτ1(y) + Iτ2(y)).
Proof. See the proof of Proposition 3.5.
Proposition 3.5 provides the utilization level as well as the production lev-
els for consumption and investment goods corresponding to the equilibrium
for any ﬁnite horizon. As in the case of complementary investment goods,
the equilibrium displays certainty equivalence.
Proposition 3.5. Suppose that the investment goods are substitutionary.
Then, in equilibrium, for τ = 0, 1, . . . , T , for j = 1, 2, given an allocation
{γ1,τ , γ2,τ}, sector j utilizes
Eτj (y) =
1 + γj,τδη
(
τ−1∑
t=0
δt (η + α)t
)
2 + δ(η + α)
(
τ−1∑
t=0
δt (η + α)t
)y (35)
units of capital for the production of
Cτj (y) =
1
2 + δ(η + α)
(
τ−1∑
t=0
δt (η + α)t
)y (36)
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units of consumption goods and
Iτj (y) =
γj,τδη
(
τ−1∑
t=0
δt (η + α)t
)
2 + δ(η + α)
(
τ−1∑
t=0
δt(η + α)t
)y (37)
units of investment goods.
Proof. We ﬁrst derive utilization, investment, and value functions in the one-
period horizon. We then consider a τ -period horizon and solve for utilization,
investment and value functions recursively. We ﬁnally impose the initial
condition given by the one-period-horizon solution.
1. Consider ﬁrst the one-period horizon. Using (5), (6) and (34), for
j, k = 1, 2, j = k, given {E1k(y), I1k(y)}, sector j’s one-period-horizon
optimal policies satisfy
{E1j (y), I1j (y)} =arg max
ej ,ij
{
ln(ej − ij) + δη ln(ij + I1k(y))
+δα ln(y − ej − E1k(y))− δ ln 2
}
. (38)
The ﬁrst-order conditions corresponding to (38) are
ej :
1
ej − ij =
δα
y − ej −E1k(y)
, (39)
ij :
1
ej − ij =
δη
ij + I1k(y)
, (40)
evaluated at ej = E
1
j (y) and ij = I
1
j (y). Since the Hessian matrix is
negative deﬁnite, the second-order condition holds. However, individ-
ual investment cannot be determined because I1j (y) and I
1
k(y) have an
eﬀect on equilibrium condition only through their sum. To see this,
for j = 1, 2, plugging C1j (y) = E
1
j (y) − I1j (y) into (39) and (40) and
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rearranging yields the system
1
C11(y)
=
δα
y − C11(y)− I11(y)− C12(y)− I12(y)
, (41)
δη
I11(y) + I
1
2(y)
=
δα
y − C11(y)− I11(y)− C12(y)− I12(y)
, (42)
1
C12(y)
=
δη
y − C12(y)− I12(y)− C11(y)− I11(y)
, (43)
δη
I11(y) + I
1
2(y)
=
δα
y − C12(y)− I12(y)− C11(y)− I11(y)
, (44)
which deﬁnes the one-period-horizon solution for the equilibrium, i.e.,
{C1j (y), I1j (y)}2j=1. From (42) and (44), one equation is redundant,
which implies that there are three equations for four unknowns. In
fact, C1j (y), C
1
k(y) and I
1
k(y) + I
1
j (y) have unique solutions, but I
1
j (y)
and I1k(y) cannot be determined separately.
Letting γj,1 ∈ (0, 1) be the fraction of total investment goods produced
by sector j in the one-period horizon, solving (39) and (40) for the
equilibrium yields the solution for one-period-horizon utilization and
investment:
E1j (y) =
1 + γj,1δη
2 + δ (η + α)
y (45)
I1j (y) = γj,1
δη
2 + δ (η + α)
y. (46)
Plugging (45) and (46) for the two sectors into the objective function
in (38) yields
V 1j (y) = (1 + δ (η + α)) ln y +Ψ1 (47)
where Ψ1 is a constant for the one-period horizon that has no eﬀect on
the solution.
2. Having solved for the one-period-horizon, we consider next a τ -period-
horizon for which the continuation value function is of the form V τ−1(y) =
κτ−1 ln y + Ψτ−1 where κτ−1 and Ψτ−1 are unknown constants. For
j, k = 1, 2, j = k, given V τ−1(y) = κτ−1 ln y +Ψτ−1 and {Eτk(y), Iτk(y)},
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sector j’s τ -period-horizon optimal policies satisfy
{Eτj (y), Iτj (y)} =arg max
ej ,ij
{ln(ej − ij) + δηκτ−1 ln(ij + Iτk(y))
+δακτ−1 ln(y − ej −Eτk(y)) + δΨτ−1} . (48)
The ﬁrst-order conditions corresponding to (48) are
ej :
1
ej − ij =
δακτ−1
y − ej −Eτk(y)
, (49)
ij :
1
ej − ij =
δηκτ−1
ij + Iτk(y)
(50)
evaluated at ej = E
τ
j (y) and ij = I
τ
j (y). Since the Hessian matrix is
negative deﬁnite, the second-order condition holds. However, as noted
in the one-period-horizon, individual investment cannot be determined
because I1j (y) and I
1
k(y) have an eﬀect on equilibrium condition only
through their sum. Letting γj,τ ∈ (0, 1) be the fraction of total invest-
ment goods produced by sector j in the τ -period horizon, Solving (49)
and (50) for the equilibrium yields the solution for utilization and in-
vestment,
Eτj (y) =
1 + γτ,jδηκτ−1
2 + δκτ−1 (η + α)
y (51)
Iτj (y) =
γτ,jδηκτ−1
2 + δκτ−1 (η + α)
y. (52)
Plugging (51) and (52) for the two sectors into the objective function
in (48) yields
V τj (y) = (1 + δκτ−1 (η + α)) ln y +Δτ (53)
≡ κτ ln y +Ψτ , (54)
where Δτ and Ψτ are constants that we ignore since they have no eﬀect
17
on the solution. Hence,
κτ = 1 + δκτ−1 (η + α) (55)
with, from (47), initial condition
κ1 = 1 + δ (η + α) . (56)
From (55) and (56), it follows that
κτ =
τ∑
t=0
δt(η + α)t. (57)
Plugging (57) into (51) and (52) yields (35) and (37). Plugging (35)
and (37) into Cτj (y) = E
τ
j (y)− Iτj (y) yields (36).
For each point in the continuum of ﬁnite-horizon equilibrium, the limits
to the ﬁnite-horizon equilibrium outcomes exist. As in the case of com-
plementary investment goods, the case of substitutionary investment goods
yields no disparity between the ﬁnite and inﬁnite horizons. Proposition 3.6
provides the equilibrium for an inﬁnite horizon, i.e., the limits of the equi-
librium outcomes in Proposition 3.5.
Proposition 3.6. Suppose that the investment goods are substitutionary. If
η + α ∈ (0, 1), then for j = 1, 2, limT→∞ETj (y) ≡ E∞j (y), limT→∞CTj (y) ≡
C∞j (y), and limT→∞ I
T
j (y) ≡ I∞j (y) exist such that, given an allocation {γ1,∞, γ2,∞},
E∞j (y) =
1− δ ((1− γj,∞)η + α)
2− δ (η + α) y (58)
C∞j (y) =
1− δ (η + α)
2− δ (η + α)y (59)
I∞j (y) =
γj,∞δη
2− δ (η + α)y. (60)
Proof. Given that η + α ∈ (0, 1), taking limits of (35), (36), and (37)
yields (58), (59) and (60).
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Although the equilibrium is a continuum, the perfect substitutability of
the investment goods implies a unique stationary distribution of capital.
Hence,
Proposition 3.7. Suppose that the investment goods are substitutionary.
Then, the stationary distribution of capital is deﬁned by
Y˜ =
(
δη˜+α˜ηη˜αα˜
(2− δ (η + α))η˜+α˜
) 1
1−(η˜+α˜)
. (61)
Proof. Plugging (58) and (60) into (34) and solving for Y˜ = yˆ = y yields (61).
Before proceeding with the comparison between the Cournot-Nash equi-
librium and the solution of the social planner, we compare diﬀerences be-
tween complements and substitutes. Apart from the uniqueness property,
by comparing Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 with Propositions 3.5 and 3.6, the
policy functions for the sectors’ behavior are of similar form. Similarly, by
comparing Propositions 3.3 and 3.7, the functional form of the stationary dis-
tribution is robust to the type of investment goods. Regardless of the belief
one can have about the type of investment goods that aﬀect non-excludable
capital, the equilibrium outcomes and the stationary distribution for capi-
tal is robust (in terms of functional forms) to diﬀerent types of investment
goods.
4 Investment Externality
Having characterized the recursive Cournot-Nash equilibrium, we study the
eﬀect of the investment externality (combined with the dynamic externality)
on behavior and the stationary distribution of capital. To that end, we ﬁrst
provide the optimal solution of a social planner in the inﬁnite horizon case.2
We then characterize the tragedy of the commons when the utilization of
2To simplify the discussion, we omit the ﬁnite-horizon case. Our results on the tragedy
of the commons hold for any ﬁnite horizon.
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capital produces both consumption and investment goods. We ﬁnally derive
the stationary distributions of capital corresponding to the social planner’s
optimal solution and compare them with the stationary distributions corre-
sponding to the recursive Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Under social planning, the inﬁnite-horizon value function of the social
planner satisﬁes
W∞(y) = max
{ej ,ij}2j=1
{
ln(e1 − i1) + ln(e2 − i2) + δEW∞(g(i1, i2, η˜) · (y − e1 − e2)α˜)
}
,
(62)
where g(i1, i2, η˜) = i
η˜1
1 i
η˜2
2 if investment goods are complements and g(i1, i2, η˜) =
(i1 + i2)
η˜ if substitutes. For j = 1, 2, let E∗∞j (y), C
∗∞
j (y), and I
∗∞
j (y) be
the optimal solutions for utilization, consumption and investment where the
symbol ∗ distinguishes optimal behavior from behavior in the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium.
Proposition 4.1 provides the social planner’s optimal solution for total
utilization, and total production of consumption and investment goods un-
der complementary and substitutionary investment goods. The introduction
of the game has an eﬀect on the comparative analysis. Under social plan-
ning with either complementary or substitutionary investment goods, there
is separation in the sense that the investment shock η has no eﬀect on total
utilization whereas the shock α has no eﬀect on total investment. However,
with a game, from Propositions 3.2 and 3.6, an increase in any of the means of
the investment shocks decreases total utilization and an increase in α causes
total investment to increase.
Proposition 4.1. There exists a unique optimal solution to (62).
1. Suppose that investment goods are complementary. If η1 + η2 + α ∈
(0, 1), then
E∗∞1 (y) + E
∗∞
2 (y) = (1− δα)y, (63)
C∗∞1 (y) + C
∗∞
2 (y) = (1− δ(η1 + η2 + α))y, (64)
I∗∞1 (y) + I
∗∞
2 (y) = δ(η1 + η2)y. (65)
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2. Suppose that investment goods are substitutionary. If η + α ∈ (0, 1),
then
E∗∞1 (y) + E
∗∞
2 (y) = (1− δα)y, (66)
C∗∞1 (y) + C
∗∞
2 (y) = (1− δ(η + α))y, (67)
I∗∞1 (y) + I
∗∞
2 (y) = δηy. (68)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Whether the investment goods are complementary or substitutionary, the
investment externality yields a tragedy in the commons in the following sense.
Under a game, total utilization increases. Moreover, the production of con-
sumption goods increases at the expense of investment goods.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose that investment goods are either complementary
or substitutionary. Then,
E∗∞1 (y) + E
∗∞
2 (y) < E
∞
1 (y) + E
∞
2 (y), (69)
and
C∗∞1 (y) + C
∗∞
2 (y) < C
∞
1 (y) + C
∞
2 (y), (70)
I∗∞1 (y) + I
∗∞
2 (y) > I
∞
1 (y) + I
∞
2 (y). (71)
Proof. Comparing Propositions 3.2, 3.6, and 4.1 yields inequalities (69), (70),
and (71).
The investment externality has an eﬀect on the stationary distribution of
capital as well. Proposition 4.3 provides the stationary distribution of capital
under social planning.
Proposition 4.3. Under social planning, the stationary distribution of cap-
ital is unique.
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1. If investment goods are complementary, then
Y ∗ =
(
ηη˜11 η
η˜2
2 α
α˜δη˜1+η˜2+α˜
) 1
1−(η˜1+η˜2+α˜) . (72)
2. If investment goods are substitutionary, then
Y ∗ =
(
ηη˜αα˜δη˜+α˜
) 1
1−(η˜+α˜) . (73)
Proof. If investment goods are complementary, then plugging (63), (81),
and (82) into (9) and solving for Y˜ ∗ = yˆ = y yields (72). Next, if investment
goods are substitutionary, then plugging (66) and (68) into (34) and solving
for Y˜ ∗ = yˆ = y yields (73).
Regardless of the type of investment goods, the eﬀect of the investment
externality on the stationary distribution is illustrated in Figure 1.3 The two
solid concave lines depict expression (2) evaluated at the highest and lowest
value of the realizations of the random shocks under social planning, i.e.,
yt+1 = g(I
∗∞
1 (yt), I
∗∞
2 (yt),η) · f(yt −E∗∞1 (yt)− E∗∞2 (yt), α). (74)
The two dotted concave lines also depict expression (2) evaluated at the
highest and lowest value of the realizations of the random shocks but under
a game, i.e.,
yt+1 = g(I
∞
1 (yt), I
∞
2 (yt),η) · f(yt −E∞1 (yt)−E∞2 (yt), α). (75)
The intersection of these lines with the 45 degree line deﬁnes the end-points
of the stationary distributions under social planning and under a game.4
Speciﬁcally, the stationary distribution under social planning has support
[Y ∗min, Y
∗
max] whereas the stationary distribution under a game has support
[Ymin, Ymax]. Since Ymin < Y
∗
min and Ymax < Y
∗
max, the eﬀect of the game with
3When investment goods are complementary, compare (32) and (72). With substitutes,
compare (61) and (73).
4Recall that in our model investment is required to maintain the capital. Without
investment, the stationary distribution is degenerate at zero.
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yt+1
yt
Ymin
Ymax
Y ∗min
Y ∗max
Figure 1: The Eﬀect of the Investment Externality on the Stationary Distri-
bution
an investment externality is to reduce the eﬀectiveness of the stock of non-
excludable capital. However, it is ambiguous whether the negative eﬀect is
strongest with complements or substitutes, i.e., it depends on the values of
the parameters.
5 Final Remarks
In order to study the eﬀect of the investment externality on utilization, pro-
duction and the dynamic path of non-excludable capital, we have considered
a stochastic environment in which agents know the true distribution of the
random shocks. However, agents generally face more than just uncertainty in
outcomes since the true distributions of these shocks are never known exactly.
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In other words, agents generally face structural uncertainty because they do
not know the structure of the economy. The issue of structural uncertainty
in a dynamic game with an investment externality is studied in a compan-
ion paper (Mirman and Santugini, 2013). Unlike uncertainty in outcomes,
structural uncertainty evolves through learning. In that case, agents make
utilization and production decisions as well as learn simultaneously about
the stochastic process. Although the characterization of a dynamic game
with Bayesian dynamics (and without the assumption of adaptive learning)
is generally intractable, we characterize the symmetric Bayesian-learning re-
cursive Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The addition of learning to a stochastic
environment is shown to have a profound eﬀect on the equilibrium since
decision-making and learning are nonseparable and inﬂuence each other.
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A Optimal Solution of the Social Planner
In this appendix, we derive the social planner’s optimal solution in the
case of complementary and substitutionary investment goods. We consider
the inﬁnite horizon by conjecturing that the value function is of the form
W∞(y) = κ∞ ln y + Ψ∞. As noted, the linear conjecture can be inferred by
solving the problem recursively.
Given W∞(y) = κ∞ ln y +Ψ∞, (62) is rewritten as
W∞(y) = max
{ej ,ij}2j=1
{ln(e1 − i1) + ln(e2 − i2) + δκ∞η1 ln i1 + δκ∞η2 ln i2
+δκ∞α ln(y − e1 − e2) + δΨ∞} (76)
if the investment goods are complementary and
W∞(y) = max
{ej ,ij}2j=1
{ln(e1 − i1) + ln(e2 − i2) + δκ∞η ln(i1 + i2)
+δκ∞α ln(y − e1 − e2) + δΨ∞} (77)
if the investment goods are substitutionary.
For complements, for j = 1, 2, the ﬁrst-order conditions corresponding
to (76) are
ej :
1
ej − ij =
δκ∞α
y − e1 − e2 , (78)
ij :
1
ej − ij =
δκ∞ηj
ij
, (79)
which yields
E∗∞j (y) =
1 + δκ∞ηj
2 + δκ∞(η1 + η2 + α)
y, (80)
I∗∞j (y) =
δκ∞ηj
2 + δκ∞(η1 + η2 + α)
y. (81)
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Plugging (80) and (81) back into (76) implies that
κ∞ =
2
1− δ(η1 + η2 + α)
. (82)
Plugging (82) into (80) and (81) and summing over j yields (63) and (65).
Plugging (63) and (65) into
∑2
j=1C
∗∞
j (y) =
∑2
j=1(E
∗∞
j (y)−I∗∞j (y)) yields (64).
For substitutes, for j = 1, 2, the ﬁrst-order conditions corresponding
to (77) are
ej :
1
ej − ij =
δκ∞α
y − e1 − e2 (83)
ij :
1
ej − ij =
δκ∞η
i1 + i2
, (84)
which yields
E∗∞j (y) =
2 + δκ∞η
4 + 2δκ∞(η + α)
y (85)
I∗∞1 (y) + I
∗∞
2 (y) =
δκ∞η
2 + δκ∞(η + α)
y (86)
since the social planner only needs to solve for total investment. Plug-
ging (85) and (86) back into (77) yields
κ∞ =
2
1− δ(η + α) . (87)
Plugging (87) into (85) and summing over j yields (66). Plugging (87)
into (86) yields (68). Plugging (66) and (68) into
∑2
j=1C
∗∞
j (y) =
∑2
j=1(E
∗∞
j (y)−
I∗∞j (y)) yields (67).
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